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ZONING CONTROL OF ABORTION CLINICS
I. INTRODUCTION
EVER SINCE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT declared that the
decision to have an abortion carries the status of a fundamental
right, state and local governments have been attempting to reconcile
the widely held perception of abortion as a social and moral evil with its
constitutional protection. Before Roe v. Wade' and Doe v. Bolton,2 the
method of solving the dilemma was criminal prosecution for performing
an abortion. The method now utilized is the regulation of abortion
clinics by cities as an exercise of the zoning power. This note will ad-
dress some of the issues involved when communities propose to use the
zoning power to limit the exercise of the constitutionally protected abor-
tion decision, focusing on abortion clinic regulations in Cleveland, Ohio,
and comparing them to ordinances in three other cities.
II. PRELIMINARY PERSPECTIVES
At the outset, it is clear that the Supreme Court has sustained steadily
broader interpretations of the permissible scope and legitimate objec-
tives of zoning. The Court first upheld the constitutionality of zoning as
a valid exercise of the police power in 1926 in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.3 In 1954, in Berman v. Parker,4 the Court held that
spiritual and aesthetic values, as well as physical and financial values,
come within the concept of the public welfare and may be factors in zon-
ing decisions. In 1974, the Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas'
declared the protection of family ideals to be a proper zoning objective.
"The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench and
unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth
values and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a
sanctuary for people."6 Should a legislature determine that "family" or
"aesthetic" values come in conflict with the presence of an abortion
clinic in the community, then the zoning power would seem to offer the
opportunity to regulate that use.
On the other hand, the decisions handed down since Roe and Doe
have defined a very narrow scope of permissible government interven-
tion in the abortion question. Roe established that the decision whether
to terminate a pregnancy in the first trimester is a fundamental con-
' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
5 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
SId. at 9.
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stitutional right and that the state may not enact legislation which
either acts as a bar to, or unduly interferes with, the abortion decision
or the physician-patient relationship. Regulations which infringe on a
fundamental constitutional right are permissible only if warranted by a
compelling state interest, and according to the Roe court, the state in-
terest is not compelling until the second trimester when "the state may
regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health."
7
Using the Roe analysis, the courts have declared invalid a number of
state and local statutes which impact in one way or another on the first
trimester abortion decision or the physician-patient relationship.
Spousal and parental consent requirements and civil and criminal
penalties for failure of the physician to exercise professional care to
preserve the life of the fetus were declared unconstitutional in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.! Extensive abortion service
regulations promulgated by the Chicago Board of Health which were ap-
plicable to any place or facility in which abortions were performed
without regard to the trimester of pregnancy involved were likewise
held to be an infringement of the right to privacy in the first trimester
in Friendship Medical Center v. Chicago Board of Health.' An Indiana
statute requiring that all abortions, including those during the first
trimester of pregnancy, be performed in a hospital or licensed health
facility with hospital back-up'" and a Youngstown, Ohio, ordinance which
effectively required any abortion clinic to be staffed in such a manner as
to provide facilities equivalent to a hospital surgical ward" were held to
be unconstitutional attempts to regulate first trimester abortions."2
7 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
, Sendak v. Arnold, 416 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Ind.), aff'd mem., 429 U.S. 968
(1976).
" Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter, 444 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ohio 1977),
affl'd, 610 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1979).
" Anti-abortion laws have also been declared invalid on the ground that they
infringed upon the first amendment rights to free speech and privacy where
states have sought to prohibit advertising or the dissemination of information on
abortion clinics. The advertising cases in general have held that states may not
impose regulations on clinics that are not imposed on comparable facilities. See
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (invalidating a state law prohibiting
advertising of abortion clinics); Mitchell Family Planning v. Royal Oak, 335 F.
Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (holding invalid an ordinance prohibiting billboard
advertising of abortion services as an unlawful restraint on freedom of speech).
For a discussion of the advertising cases, see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CON-




At the same time, a few cases have defined some legitimate state ac-
tion during the first trimester. In Bellotti v. Baird,'3 the Supreme Court
repeated that a restriction on obtaining a lawful abortion is not un-
constitutional unless it unduly interferes with the right to seek an abor-
tion. "Not all distinction between abortion and other procedures is for-
bidden. The constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it."'4 Thus, recordkeeping and informed
consent requirements were upheld in Danforth.'5 Regulations to insure
that first trimester abortions be performed by medically competent per-
sonnel were upheld in Connecticut v. Menillo.'" This decision was based
on the theory that the lack of state interest in maternal health during
the first trimester "is predicated upon the first trimester abortions be-
ing as safe for the woman as normal childbirth at term, and that
predicate holds true only if the abortion is performed by medically com-
petent personnel under conditions insuring maximum safety for the
woman."" A Connecticut regulation exempting nontherapeutic abor-
tions from the state medicaid program which otherwise generally sub-
sidized medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth was sus-
tained in Maher v. Roe.'8 The Court in Maher reasoned that Roe's pro-
hibition on interference with the abortion decision did not preclude the
state from making a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion
13 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
'" Id. at 149-50.
15 Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
11 423 U.S. 9 (1975). In Menillo, a Connecticut statute which made criminal an
attempted abortion by "any person" was held to remain fully effective against
performance of abortions by non-physicians, even though Roe and Doe would
have nullified the statute if applied to physicians.
Id. at 11.
1' 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), and Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977), decided the same day as Maher, permitted states and localities to
express a childbirth preference by refusing to fund elective abortions in city
hospitals (Poelker) and denying Social Security funds for elective abortions
(Beal).
The United States Supreme Court might face the question of how far Con-
gress and the states can express pro-birth preference through the appropriation
of funds when it hears McRae v. H.E.W., 48 U.S.L.W. 2492 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
1980), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (Feb. 19,
1980), and Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), appeal filed, 48 U.S.L.W.
3298 (Sept. 22, 1979), juris. postponed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356 (Nov. 27, 1979). Both
cases challenge the constitutionality of the so-called Hyde Amendment (a series
of amendments to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare annual ap-
propriation acts) which, since fiscal year 1977, have prohibited the use of federal
Medicaid funds for abortions except where necessary to preserve the life of the
mother or to terminate pregnancies caused by rape or incest. See Pub. L. No.
94-439 § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976); Pub. L. No. 95-205 § 101, 91 Stat. 1460,
1460 (1977); Pub. L. No. 96-86 § 118, 93 Stat. 656, 662 (1979). The district court in
Zbaraz held that the Illinois statute tracking the Hyde Amendment violated
equal protection in treating medically necessary abortions differently from other
1979]
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and implementing that value judgment by the state's method of
allocating public funds.
III. THE ABORTION CLINIC ZONING CONTROVERSY IN CLEVELAND
The Cleveland, Ohio, abortion clinic ordinance is probably the least in-
nocuous of the challenged zoning attempts and therefore the most ap-
propriate test case for deciding the limits of the zoning power in this
area. In December, 1973, the Cleveland City Council passed Ordinance
No. 1861-A-73, now chapter 231 of the city health code, setting forth
regulations for facilities offering abortion services. The regulations ap-
plicable to first trimester abortions include requirements relating to
persons qualified to perform abortions, recordkeeping, counseling and
informed consent provisions, necessary laboratory procedures,
emergency procedures, availability of adequate oxygen, intravenous
fluids, anesthetic and resuscitation equipment, and recovery facilities.19
The ordinance provides that licenses are to be granted upon inspection
by and the approval of the Director of Public Health after payment of an
annual $100.00 fee.' These regulations seem to be consistent with the
state's interest in assuring that first trimester abortions be performed
by medically competent personnel under conditions to insure maximum
safety, as described in Menillo."
The zoning implications of the Cleveland ordinance first appeared in
1977 in response to the efforts of West Side Women's Services, Inc. to
open a low cost first trimester abortion service in a local retail business
district. The proposed clinic, which would have been the first to open on
the west side of Cleveland, aroused a great deal of public opposition.'
On July 17, 1977, the city council passed as emergency legislation an
amendment to the health code which banned abortion clinics in local
retail business districts. 3 The effect of the ordinance was to establish
medically necessary surgical procedures. The district court in McRae held that
the denial of funds for other than life-endangering medically necessary abortions
violated first and fourth amendment liberty interests. See also Hodgson v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 614 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1980); Reproductive Health Servs. v.
Freeman, 614 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1980). [Editor's note: The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae, __ U.S.L.W.
__ (June 30, 1980)].
19 CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 231.03 (1976).
Id §§ 231.06-.08.
21 Connecticut v. Menillo, 428 U.S. 9 (1975); see notes 16-19 supra and accom-
panying text.
I Councilman Robert Getz, who opposed the clinic and in whose ward it was
to be located, was quoted: "I was only responding to the wishes of the majority of
my constituency. This was not a personal vendetta. Councilman Keane and I
were presented with a petition with at least 7,000 names on it from our wards op-
posing the clinic." Cleveland Press, Nov. 3, 1977, at B-3, col. 1.
2 CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 231.09 (1978 Supp):
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Codified Ordinances, no




abortion clinics (distinct from other medical clinics) as a prohibited-use
classification in local retail business zones."
West Side Women's Services, Inc., and Dr. Richard Derman, the phys-
ician who was to perform the abortions, brought suit against the city in
federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the
enforcement of the ordinance on the basis of due process and equal protec-
tion violations. The court, in West Side Women's Services, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland,25 denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction,
holding that the ordinance bore a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests and that the primary requirement for granting injunctive
relief- probability of success on the merits- was not met."
for an abortion service to be located in a Local Retail Business District
as set forth in Section 343.01 of the Codified Ordinances, and no abortion
service shall operate in a Local Retail Business District.
2 The zoning code defines local business district as: "A business district adja-
cent to or surrounded on at least three sides by Residence Districts in which such
uses are permitted as are normally required for the daily local retail business
needs of the residents of the locality only." CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED OR-
DINANCES § 343.01(a) (1976).
The following uses are among those permitted in a local retail business
district:
Business offices: real estate, insurance and other similar offices, and the
offices of the architectural, clerical, engineering, legal, dental, medical or
other established recognized professions, but excluding morticians,
undertakers and funeral directors, in which only such personnel are
employed as are customarily required for the practice of such business
or profession and not exceeding a total of five persons at any one time.
Id. § 343.01(b)(3).
, 450 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ohio), affd mem., 582 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
" The plaintiffs did not raise, nor did the court address, the significant pro-
cedural due process problems with the enactment of the ordinance, but rather
relied exclusively on substantive grounds. The ordinance was not enacted as a
zoning measure according to statutory requirements. The Cleveland City Charter
specifies the procedures to be followed when the city council desires to pass a
zoning regulation:
All ordinances or resolutions of Council or acts of any administrative
official or agency of the City of Cleveland which . . .concern zoning or
other regulations affecting or controlling the use or development of land
or otherwise come within the functions of the Planning Commission ...
before adoption and before they shall become legal or binding upon the
City, shall be submitted to the Planning Commission for report and
recommendation. Any matter so referred to the Planning Commission
shall be acted upon by the Planning Commission within thirty (30) days
from the date of referral ....
CLEVELAND, OHIO, CHARTER § 76-3 (1976).
The city charter section describing the powers and duties of the City Plan-
ning Commission specifies that "no general plan or portions thereof shall be
adopted by the Commission until after a public hearing thereon." Id. § 76-2. The
charter also gives the council the authority to pass zoning regulations: "The
Council shall by ordinance provide regulations and restrictions governing... the
1979]
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IV. ZONING ABORTION CLINICS: THE ISSUES
A. Popular Sentiment Versus Minority Rights
Since it is evident that the Cleveland ordinance was an attempt to
gauge and document the desires of the community, the question must be
asked as to how much weight is to be given to such public sentiment. Is
it overemphasizing the first amendment protection accorded to the
abortion decision to say that the rights of women who want access to
abortion clinics are paramount to those of the members of the community
who are hostile to legal abortion?
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Framingham Clinic, Inc. v.
Board of Selectmen27 thought the first amendment protection warranted
such a construction. Framingham Clinic leased premises to operate an
abortion clinic in an industrial park area of Southborough,
location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence
and other purposes, and such other matters pertinent thereto as may be compe-
tent for this Charter to authorize." Id § 76-5. Pursuant to this power, the zoning
code requires that zoning amendments be submitted to the Planning Commission
and that public hearings be held:
Council may . . . amend or change the maps, districts, setback building
lines or regulations of this Zoning Code, provided that before such action
is taken the matter shall first be submitted to the Planning Commission
for its opinion and recommendations. The Commission shall be allowed a
reasonable time, not less than thirty days, for consideration and report
thereon, and a public hearing shall be held before the appropriate com-
mittee of Council. Ten days' notice of such public hearing and of the in-
tention to amend or change the maps, districts, setback building lines or
regulations shall be given by publication in the City Record.
CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 333.01 (1976).
There was no referral to the Planning Commission, no Planning Commission
report, and no public hearing prior to the enactment of section 231.09. The city
council circumvented the notice and hearing requirements by enacting section
231.09 as an emergency ordinance to take effect immediately under the pro-
cedures set forth in the city charter.
The Council may by a twothirds vote of the members elected thereto,
pass emergency measures to take effect at the time indicated therein.
An emergency measure is an ordinance or resolution for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, property, health, or safety, or pro-
viding for the usual daily operation of a Municipal department, in which
the emergency is set forth and defined in a preamble thereto.
CLEVELAND, OHIO, CHARTER § 36 (1976).
While the council has the authority to enact emergency legislation without
meeting the notice and hearing requirements of ordinary legislation, the pjwer
to enact zoning measures is specifically granted as defined in Cleveland City
Charter sections 76-3 and 76-5 and Codified Ordinances section 333.01, which
mandate public hearing and notice. If enacted as a zoning ordinance pursuant to
such procedures, the substance of section 231.09 would logically be located in sec-
tion 343.01, so that abortion clinics would have been listed along with funeral
parlors as exceptions to the permissible uses in local retail business districts. In-
stead, section 231.09 is part of the health code and arguably ineffective as a zon-
ing regulation.




Massachusetts. State law required that in order to obtain licensing the
corporation show that its proposed use would not be in conflict with
any applicable zoning ordinance or by-law. While preliminary steps in
the approval process were underway, the town Planning Board held a
public hearing to consider an amendment to the zoning by-laws which
added abortion clinics to the list of prohibited uses in all districts.28 Based
on the public hearing, the Planning Board issued a report to the Town
Meeting that adoption of the by-law was "consistent with the desires of
a substantial number of residents and a clear expression of how they
wish to regulate the use of land, buildings and structures within the
town." ' The court, in invalidating the ordinance, said that public senti-
ment cannot be considered when to act in accord with such sentiment in-
hibits the right to terminate a pregnancy: "The desires of members of
the community to disfavor an abortion clinic ... cannot extenuate such a
violation. The report of the Southborough Planning Board about public
sentiment was thus an irrelevancy, and a dangerous one, for that way
would be the extinction of many liberties which are indeed constitu-
tionally guaranteed against invasion by a majority."3
In Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care Center, Ina v. Arft,3' a pro-
posed abortion clinic in the Wisconsin town of Grand Chute elicited a
similar negative public response. Upon newspaper reports that Fox
Valley Reproductive Health Care intended to open a clinic, the town
Board of Health held a public meeting to gather citizen testimony. The
meeting resulted in one resolution opposing abortion and the establish-
ment of abortion clinics and a second resolution authorizing the Town
Council to draft an ordinance regulating operation of the proposed
clinic. The ordinance subsequently passed set forth thirty-eight lengthy
provisions regulating licensing, building plans, specifications, record-
keeping, and staffing aspects of abortion clinics and also permitted such
clinics to be located only in heavy industrial districts. The court implied
that the zoning and building aspects of the ordinance would not be
upheld when tried on the merits because "based on the chronology of
events set forth . . . plaintiff is reasonably likely to show that both of
these alleged deficiencies are actually disguised attempts to improperly
regulate or proscribe abortion procedures." 2
28 The amendment added to the zoning by-laws the words "Abortion Clinics"
as the fifth of "Prohibited Uses- All Districts." The other prohibited uses for all
districts were trailer camps, commercial racetracks, junk yards, and piggeries or
fur farms. Id at 608-09.
Id at 608.
30 Id at 611. In addition, the court used the "compelling state interest" test,
stating that "[tihe regulation appears on its face to be an incursion into the basic
right [of abortion] without acceptable justification." Id. at 610.
31 446 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (granting plaintiffs motion for
preliminary injunction).
3' Id at 1075.
19791
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There is no doubt that there was vocal public sentiment against West
Side Women's Services' proposed clinic when Cleveland amended its or-
dinance in July, 1977,"3 and that the zoning regulation passed was a
response thereto. The court in West Side Women's Services, Ina" found
no problem with the expression of public disapproval as a zoning regula-
tion. Relying on Maher v. Roe, 5 the court declared that there was a
legitimate state interest in promoting live birth over abortion, that the
state was not forbidden from making a pro-birth value judgment, and
that the City of Cleveland's decision to deny abortion clinics the right to
operate in local retail business districts while according other surgical
clinics that right "appears to be consonant with such a value
judgment."3
However, Maher did not state that such a value judgment might be
exercised in any fashion or through the use of any governmental power,
but rather "by the allocation of public funds."37 The state might, in other
words, affirmatively promote live birth through the expenditure of
public funds while remaining neutral with regard to public funds for
abortion. In language implying that the value judgment may not be ex-
ercised in a prohibitive manner, the Maher Court stated:
There is a basic difference between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alter-
native activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional
concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will
by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed
to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader. 8
The petition to Councilman Getz discussed in note 22 supra is one indicator
of public sentiment. West Side Women's Services had unsuccessfully attempted
to open a clinic in suburban Lakewood before selecting the Cleveland site.
Several western suburbs adopted stringent abortion clinic regulations in 1977,
echoing the sentiments of the Parma Heights law director. "The feeling of City
Council and the Mayor is that before an abortion clinic comes to Parma Heights,
the U.S. Supreme Court will have to tell us twice." Cleveland Plain Dealer, May
27, 1977, at B-5, col. 1. Parma Heights then passed an ordinance requiring all
abortions to be performed in a hospital, and Parma Heights has no hospitals.
Rocky River, another western suburb, considered banning all medical clinics
or alternatively creating a medical use district classification (requiring applicants
to go through rezoning and public hearing procedures) and reserving to the
public the right of referendum against the clinic. "These ordinances are a form of
harassment," according to Penny Steenblock of the National Association of Abor-
tion Facilities; "if taken to the Supreme Court they'd be overruled. But it takes a
lot of time and money to do that." Cleveland Press, Apr. 19, 1977, at D-10, cols. 1,
3.
, West Side Women's Services, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F. Supp. 796
(N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 582 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978);
see notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
5 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see note 18 supra and accompanying text.
450 F. Supp. at 798.





The enactment of a zoning prohibition as a means of implementing value
judgment against abortions seems to be an attempt by the state to im-
pose its will by force of law on a protected activity.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas' approved the protection of family
values as a permissible zoning objective, but the Court in Belle Terre
did not say that such zoning was valid if the "value" was in opposition to
a fundamental right. There being no fundamental right for several
unrelated persons to maintain a common household, the Court found
that legislating the community value in opposition to such living ar-
rangements was within the zoning power. But when the preference for
the nuclear family living pattern was expressed in the East Cleveland
family ordinance, the Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland" found
an impermissible exercise of the zoning power because it impacted on
the constitutionally protected family privacy. Similarly, when public
protests against a proposed abortion clinic in St. Paul, Minnesota, prompt-
ed the city council to study whether special zoning restrictions
should be imposed, the United States court of appeals in Planned Parent-
hood of Minnesota v. Citizens for Community Action," after discussing
the extent of constitutional protection afforded the abortion right, said
"there is no judicial authority allowing a municipality, by imposing
special restrictive zoning requirements on first trimester abortion
clinics, to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly by medical
regulation."4
B. The Issue of Impact
The language in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota is interesting
because it implies a near total prohibition on zoning as applied to abor-
tion clinics.43 In Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, the town had not yet
' 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
40 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The East Cleveland, Ohio, single family zoning code
defined "family" as no more than one married couple and their parents and per-
mitted no more than one set of grandchildren to live with their grandparents.
The Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment in that the ordinance interfered with the strong con-
stitutional protection of the sanctity of the family. Id. at 503-06. Belle Terre was
distinguished because the ordinance at issue in that case affected only unrelated
individuals while the East Cleveland ordinance regulated the "occupancy of its
housing by slicing deeply into the family itself." Id at 498. Because the impact on
the constitutionally protected family was so direct, the Court abdicated its usual
deference to the legislature and declared that the city's avowed purposes of
preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and
avoiding undue financial burden on the schools did not justify this zoning
measure. Id. at 499-500.
41 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977).
42 Id. at 868.
This rule would undermine the argument of the City of Cleveland in West
Side Women's Services Inc-, that the rational basis test rather than the compelling
state interest test should be applied in judging the validity of the ordinance. The
1979]
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enacted any zoning regulation; rather, the city council had imposed a
six-month moratorium on the construction of separate abortion facilities
pending a study of whether special zoning restrictions should be imposed
based upon the determination of the effects of clinics on the integrity of
existing land use controls and their relationship to the comprehensive
plan." Drawing from Sendak v. Arnold,"' the court reasoned that
municipalities may not impose special locational requirements on the
construction of first trimester abortion clinics. Such locational re-
quirements would constitute undue interference.
In West Side Women's Services, Inc-, the City of Cleveland argued a dif-
ferent construction of the Sendak decision, emphasizing the impact of
the ordinance rather than its substance. According to the city, the
Indiana statute requiring hospital back-up was unconstitutional because
it had the effect of preventing low cost first trimester abortions in free-
standing clinics and thus operated as a substantial or undue in-
terference with the abortion decision."6 Locational requirements which
do not unduly or substantially interfere with the protected right, the city
argued, must therefore be judged according to the rational basis test.
On the basis of the city's argument, the court found no undue in-
city argued that if the ordinance did not unduly interfere with the abortion deci-
sion, it must be sustained if it bore a rational relationship to a constitutionally
permissible objective. Brief of Defendants-Appellees City of Cleveland at 13,
West Side Women's Services, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 582 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir.
1978).
" The ordinance, adopted after public hearings, read in part:
[A] moratorium is hereby placed on the construction, reconstruction,
adaption and modification of separate abortion facilities and other like
facilities within the City of Saint Paul, and a moratorium on the issuance
of permits for same .... [T]he Planning Commission is hereby directed to
conduct a study of the effects of such facilities on the integrity of ex-
isting land use controls within the City, including proposed amendments
to existing ordinances, the relationship of such facilities to the com-
prehensive plan, and any additional considerations the Planning Com-
mission deems appropriate, and make recommendations thereon to the
City Council within five months of the effective date of this resolution ....
558 F.2d at 864.
"5 416 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Ind.), affd mem, 429 U.S. 968 (1976); see note 10 supra
and accompanying text. The reasoning is circuitous, however. Sendak involved pro-
visions in an Indiana statute requiring that all abortions be performed in a hospital
or licensed medical facility. A three-judge federal district court panel ruled that
regulations as to the type of facility in which an abortion is to be performed can
occur only at the end of the first trimester. The Planned Parenthood of Min-
nesota court interpreted Sendak as a ruling that states may not regulate where
first trimester abortions are to be performed, and the Supreme Court's summary
affirmance in Sendak, constituting a disposition on the merits, "supports Planned
Parenthood's argument that municipalities can not impose moratoriums and
special locational requirements on the construction of first trimester abortion
clinics." 558 F.2d at 868.




terference by the ordinance because it only banned abortion clinics in
certain areas and because women already had access to abortion
facilities in other areas of the city.47 The court distinguished both Planned
Parenthood of Minnesota and Framingham Clinic'8 because the or-
dinances at issue in those cases would have had the effect of banning
abortion clinics from the entire political subdivision.49
C. The Equal Protection Problem
Even if a zoning regulation does not operate as a complete bar to ob-
taining an abortion at a free-standing clinic within the city, there re-
mains the question of whether the separate-use classification meets
equal protection standards. Cleveland's ordinance setting forth per-
missible uses in local retail business districts allows those uses "as are
normally required for the daily local retail business needs of the
residents of the locality only"5 and includes medical offices employing
five persons or less. Therefore, the abortion practitioner, by implication,
is classified differently from other medical practitioners who operate
either alone or in comparatively small medical clinics, and the abortion
, In 1977, there were four free-standing first trimester abortion clinics in
Cleveland and nine hospitals offering first and second trimester abortion ser-
vices. Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit
"B," West Side Women's Services, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F. Supp. 796
(N.D. Ohio 1978). None of the clinics were located on the west side, and only two
of the hospitals were located on the west side.
" Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen, 367 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1976);
see notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
,1 450 F. Supp. at 798.
Although Planned Parenthood's clinic would have been the first free-standing
facility in the St. Paul area and the district court in Minnesota stressed that the
fact helped to give the moratorium ordinance the impact of undue interference,
the whole question as to whether any special locational requirements would be
valid was not related to the number of clinics in operation at that time. Special
locational requirements aimed at curbing access to abortion were prohibited
under state law. 558 F.2d at 868. The district court found violations of state zon-
ing law because of the discriminatory and bad faith enactment of the ordinance
calling for the moratorium and also because the zoning power, though broad, did
not contemplate regulation of medical practices. Under Minnesota law, a zoning
measure enacted outside the zoning power is null and void. Id.
The Framingham Clinic ordinance had declared abortion clinics a prohibited
use, but the Massachusetts Supreme Court found the argument that there was no
undue interference because abortions were available in nearby towns to be
without merit; that a Southborough woman would have to travel to Boston,
Brighton, Brookline, or Springfield to find a first trimester abortion clinic was
enough evidence to show the undue interference of Southborough's ordinance.
367 N.E.2d at 612. The court declined to speculate whether the constitutional in-
fringement would be so slight as to be unworthy of note if a first trimester abor-
tion facility were available across the border from Southborough in nearby
Framingham. Id.
' CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 343.01(a) (1976), set out at note
24 supra.
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procedure itself is distinguished from other lawful forms of outpatient
surgery.
There is some question as to whether a physician in private practice
who occasionally performs an abortion would be barred from doing so if
his office were located in a local retail business district. The ordinance
defining "abortion service," which applies to both first and second
trimester abortions, specifies:
"Abortion service" means an individual physician, group prac-
tice or physicians, clinic, hospital or other firm, agency, institu-
tion or organization by whom or under whose auspices and con-
trol abortions are performed, whether as a primary service or as
an integral part of a broader practice or group of medical ser-
vices, and his or their physical facilities used in the performance
of an abortion. 1
Depending on how one defines "integral," a weak but plausible argu-
ment could be made that all the regulations applicable to first trimester
facilities, including the zoning restriction, would not apply to the private
physician who occasionally performs an abortion in his office. If such a
duly licensed private physician who may forseeably perform an occa-
sional abortion is in fact subject to the ordinance, he would be required
to locate his office in a general retail or industrial district, even though
he does not plan to regard himself as an abortion practitioner or his
practice as an abortion service.
In Framingham Clinic, the court was struck by the blatant discrim-
ination against abortion clinics. Abortion clinics were prohibited by
the zoning by-law while clinics which ofered other lawful medical
services were not prohibited; private physicians who offered abortion
services were similarly unaffected by the ordinance. Under the
Massachusetts court's analysis, application of the Cleveland ordinance to
the individual physician who might occasionally perform an abortion
would violate equal protection under either interpretation of integral:
"It may make the point more sharply, perhaps, to note that the legal
vices would be in substance the same, had the regulation taken the
more obviously grotesque form of 'zoning out' of the town the private of-
fices of any physician who proposed to perform lawful first trimester
abortions there. '52 The concurring justice, while noting the presumption
of validity in favor of zoning amendments, concluded that even without
the constitutional problems involved there was no rational basis for
classifying an abortion clinic differently from any other medical clinic
and that an ordinance attempting to exclude orthopedic clinics should
fail under the same analysis.'
Id at § 231.01(d) (emphasis added).
367 N.E.2d at 610.




Planned Parenthood of Minnesota had likewise planned to operate its
clinic in a zoning district where other medical offices, clinics, and
laboratories were permitted uses. The court noted that before the
moratorium ordinance was passed there was no dispute that the proposed
clinic would be a proper use within the district. The city had indicated it
would require adequate hospital back-up for abortion clinics in its zon-
ing regulation. In the discussion concluding that Planned Parenthood
would probably succeed on the merits, the court added parenthetically
that one defect in the city's case was its failure to impose a similar re-
quirement on the other medical facilities in the district which performed
surgical procedures entailing a risk of serious complication. 4 The court
seemed to imply that the absence of such a requirement for all other
clinics is evidence -f discriminatory intent against abortion facilities.
55
In West Side Women's Services, Inc. the City of Cleveland argued that
the five-employee limitation in the local retail business district profes-
sional office -category weakened the abortion clinic's equal protection
claims, for that limitation excluded a whole segment of medical offices of
any nature as permissible uses in the district. It is nrore , rrect to say
that the plaintiffs misstated the issue in complaining that all medical of-
fices were permitted while abortion clinics were not. The five-c iployee
limitation relates to traditional police power objectives such as traff'2 or
noise control. It is equally applicable to all professional offices in local
retail business districts, and while it would operate to exclude larger
medical clinics, it does so for legitimate police power concerns and not
to discriminate between types of medical practice. Thus, an abortion
clinic employing more than five persons would be too large a business to
legally operate within a local retail business district. What seems to be
at fault with the Cleveland ordinance is that it treats abortion clinics
differently from other medical clinics of identical characteristics within
the purpose of local retail business district zoning objectives.
D. Preliminary Injunctions
Of the four abortion clinic zoning cases previously discussed,' only
Framingham Clinic reached a disposition on the merits of the claim.
" Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d
861, 868 n.7 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1358 (8th
Cir. 1976)). In Hodgson, the Minnesota state regulations on first trimester abor-
tion clinics were challenged as unconstitutional. The United States court of ap-
peals reasoned that a state can impose the same regulations on first trimester
abortion clinics as are imposed on clinics that perform surgical procedures requir-
ing approximately the same degree of skill and care as first trimester abortions,
but "where the state regulates abortions beyond its regulation of similar surgical
procedures, that difference in treatment must be necessitated by the particular
characteristics of the abortion procedure." Id.
See 558 F.2d at 868 n.7.
Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d
861 (8th Cir. 1977), discussed in, e.g., notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text;
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Because the Southborough ordinance banned first trimester clinics
totally, the court reasoned that the facts placed the case well beyond
the borderline of invalidity. 7 In the other three cases, where the zoning
prohibition was less than total, the Planned Parenthood and Fox Valley
courts granted preliminary injunctions; the court in West Side Women's
Services, Inc did not. In analyzing the motions, each court used some com-
bination of the following factors to be considered in granting a motion
for preliminary injunction: the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff,
the balancing of that harm to the threat of injury to the defendant if the
injunction were granted, the probability of success on the merits, and
the public interest at stake.58
In Fox Valley, the court concluded that preliminary injunctive relief
was warranted on the basis of irreparable injury because the cost of
complying with the town regulations would raise the fee for performing
abortions to an amount which would be beyond the economic means of
poor women.59 The clinic was located in an area zoned for commercial
uses, and the ordinance specified that a clinic could be located only in a
heavy industrial district. The corporation had leased and remodeled the
building, incurring substantial expenditures. To bring the clinic in com-
pliance with the provisions passed by the Town Council, the court deter-
mined, would mean that the clinic would have to raise the proposed
abortion fee from $150.00 to perhaps $500.00; the threatened harm to
the plaintiff outweighed any harm the injunction might inflict on the
town."0 Further, the court determined that if the dispute were fully
litigated, Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care Center was likely to suc-
West Side Women's Services, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F. Supp. 796 (N.D.
Ohio), affd mem., 582 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978),
discussed in, e.g., notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text; Fox Valley
Reproductive Health Care Center, Inc. v. Arft, 446 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Wis.
1978), discussed in, e.g., notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text; Framingham
Clinic, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen, 367 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1977), discussed in, e.g.,
notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
57 367 N.E.2d at 610.
' The Wisconsin district court in Fox Valley, citing Fox Valley Harvestore,
Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 545 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1976), placed
the burden on plaintiffs to show that they had no adequate remedy at law and
would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction did not issue, that the threatened
injury to plaintiffs outweighed harm to the defendants, that plaintiffs had a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and that granting of the injunction
would do no disservice to the public interest. 446 F. Supp. at 1073. The Planned
Parenthood court, citing Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d
1323 (8th Cir. 1973), required plaintiff to show substantial probability of success
on the merits and irreparable harm if an injunction were not forthcoming. 558
F.2d at 866. West Side Women's Services, Inc. cited Virginia Petroleum Jobber
Ass'n v. F.P.C., 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958) as authority for requiring probability of
success on the merits in order to obtain a preliminary injunction. 450 F. Supp. at
799.





ceed on the merits because the regulations were a burdensome in-
terference and the zoning requirement was an improper attempt to pro-
scribe abortion procedures."' The court further reasoned that since the
ordinance was probably unconstitutional, the public interest was best
served by obeying the Constitution. The injunction was granted. 2
In Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, irreparable injury to Planned Par-
enthood and its prospective clients was apparent to the court. Relying on
the zoning classification in effect at the time, the corporation had pur-
chased the land and the buildings for its new facility for $200,000.00,
financing the entire amount. The subsequent moratorium ordinance
thus forestalled the opening of the clinic and the revenue Planned
Parenthood hoped to generate to discharge the debt. 3 The court found
further irreparable injury in the denial of the constitutional rights of
Planned Parenthood and its patients and the damage to its goodwill."'
Finally, the court accepted the district court's finding that the or-
dinance, as the first attempt by the city council to restrict abortion
operations, was directed primarily at Planned Parenthood and was
discriminatorily motivated.65 This finding supported both the district
court's determination of irreparable injury the and probability of suc-
cess on the merits. The court further found probability of success on the
merits in what it determined to be an impermissible use of the zoning
power to regulate abortion clinics indirectly, something the city council
could not do directly by medical regulation. The zoning measure was a
disguised attempt to regulate medical practices and therefore imper-
missible as without the city's authority under state law. 7
In the Cleveland case, the district court reached the opposite result
when faced with the motion for a preliminary injunction. First, the court
did not address the question of irreparable injury, probably due to the
fact of insufficient pleadings by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not allege
the amount they had expended in leasing and preparing the building for
opening as an abortion clinic, 8 nor had they applied for or paid a license
fee or estimated a loss of revenue or goodwill caused by the ordinance,69
factors which persuaded the courts in the Fox Valley and Planned
Parenthood of Minnesota cases. On the question of probability of suc-
cess on the merits, the court started with the opposite assumption of
6 Id. at 1075.
e' Id.
558 F.2d at 866.




See Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Plaintiffs, West
Side Women's Services, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ohio
1978).
69 450 F. Supp. at 797.
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the court in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota in holding that the exer-
cise of a value judgment against abortion was a valid zoning objective.
Since the ordinance did not operate as a total ban on abortion facilities,
it was therefore subject only to the rational basis test."0 Further, the
court, unlike the Planned Parenthood of Minnesota court, saw nothing
suspect in the application of a zoning classification masquerading as a
regulation of medical procedures. While the Planned Parenthood of Min-
nesota and Fox Valley courts found the evidence of discriminatory
motivation to indicate probability of success on the merits, the same
evidence brought no such reaction from the West Side Women's Ser-
vices, Inc. court.71
V. THE USE OF ZONING
It is helpful to look to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc."7 for guidance in determining the
extent of the power of local governments in applying zoning regulations
to situations which may involve first amendment rights. Young involved
the issue of protection to be accorded to sex-oriented businesses. Com-
munities have traditionally sought to control sex-oriented businesses
through obscenity statutes. This means of control is an ineffective and
extremely litigious approach, due in part to the steadily narrowed and
constantly changing definitions of obscenity, the susceptibility of local
obscenity ordinances to constitutional attack, and the fact that each pro-
secution must be individually adjudicated. The city of Detroit turned to
zoning as an alternative means of control in 1972 when the city council
added adult motion picture theaters and adult bookstores to the list of
regulated uses in the city's "anti-skid-row" ordinance. Under that law,
"skid-row" uses such as pawnshops, pool halls, topless entertainment
cabarets, adult bookstores, and adult theaters were subject to a
conditional-use permit process. No permit would be granted to one of
these uses within 500 feet of a residentially zoned district, and no such
use would be permitted within 1,000 feet of any two other regulated
uses. 3 The purpose of the ordinance, stated in acceptable planning and
zoning police power terms, is contained in its preamble:
In the development and execution of this Ordinance, it is
recognized that there are some uses which, because of their
very nature, are recognized as having serious objectionable
operational characteristics, particularly when several of them
are concentrated under certain circumstances thereby having a
deleterious effect upon the adjacent areas. Special regulation of
70 Id. at 798-99.
71 Id. at 799.
712 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
11 DETROIT, MICHIGAN, OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 66.0000, 66.0103,




these uses is necessary to insure that these adverse effects will
not contribute to the blighting or downgrading of the surround-
ing neighborhood .... The primary control or regulation is for
the purpose of preventing a concentration of these uses in any
one area ....74
Operators of two adult theaters and the owner of an adult bookstore
challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance in Nortown Theatre,
Inc. v. Gribbs.5 The district court struck down the 500-foot requirement
as a near total ban on sex-oriented businesses but upheld the 1,000-foot
anti-clustering limitation using a compelling state interest analysis. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the zoning power
could be used to restrict location of all theaters or bookstores but not to
single out adult bookstores and theaters on the basis of content." The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision, holding the 1,000-foot
requirement a valid exercise of the zoning power.77 Straying from the
concept of strict content neutrality, the Court reasoned that erotic
speech may be entitled to a lesser degree of protection than social,
political, or philosophical speech and that the state's interest in protect-
ing the quality of urban life justified a content classification on erotic
materials which differed from other motion pictures or books." Concur-
ring, Justice Powell skirted the content distinction issue and found the
ordinance to be an "innovative land use regulation, implementing First
11 DETROIT, MICHIGAN, OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 66.0000, reprinted in F.
STROM, supra note 73, at 48.
71 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd sub nom. American Mini Theatres,
Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), decision of appeals court rev'd sub
nom. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
76 American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd
sub nom. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
77 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
78 The Court stated:
Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment will not
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting
this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude
than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired
Voltaire's immortal comment. Whether political oratory or philosophical
discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every
schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak re-
mains the same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off
to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities"
exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though the First Amend-
ment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we
hold that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials
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Amendment concerns only incidentally and to a limited extent."7 9 Apply-
ing the test to government regulations which incidentally affect com-
municative conduct as announced in United States v. O'Brien,8 Justice
Powell found that the purpose of the ordinance was not to suppress free
speech but to prevent the secondary effects of these uses on
neighborhoods and was therefore valid."'
Thus, in Young the 1,000-foot limitation was held valid because it bore
a rational relationship to the accepted zoning purpose of preventing
neighborhood blight" and had only a limited effect on first amendment
rights. The 500-foot limitation was held invalid because it operated as a
ban on free speech and was thus invalid as a prior restraint. The Young
decision seems to allow a minimum amount of tampering with the exer-
cise of a first amendment protected right through zoning if the purpose
was not to hinder that right but to cure the adverse effects of its exer-
cise upon the community; the Court would not allow a legislative deter-
mination that sex-oriented businesses per se were against public policy
and, therefore, could be banned through the zoning power. Many com-
mentators expressed fears that local communities would use the Young
decision to justify their efforts to suppress sexually explicit material
and thereby control constitutionally protected social and personal
behavior under the pretext of zoning."
In applying the principles of the Young decision to the abortion clinic
cases, it seems that to sustain these ordinances lends credence to the
fears of Young's critics since the purposes of the ordinances were to
exert zoning control over social and personal behavior. Two of the cases,
Fox Valley and Framingham Clinic, specifically involved ordinances
which expressed a public condemnation of abortion. While the Cleveland
ordinance contained no such statement of public disapproval, the
language of the West Side Women's Services, Inc court that a legislative
Id at 73 (Powell, J., concurring).
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"' 427 U.S. at 82-84 & n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
"2 The evidence included the city council's determination that a concentration
of adult theaters in an area led to deterioration and the spread of crime, an effect
not attributable to theaters showing other types films, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34, and
reports from sociologists and urban planners on the cycle of decay started in
other cities by the influx of such theaters. Id at 81. n.4.
I "It seems that if Young is applied in the future as a zoning case, then the ef-
fect of the Berman-Belle Terre-Young line of cases will be to give cities nearly
plenary power to zone out their troubles." Note, Constitutional Law-First
Amendment-Content Neutrality, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 456, 489 n.246 (1978).
For other interpretations of the impact and meaning of the Young decision, see F.
STROM, supra note 73; W. TONER, REGULATING SEX BUSINESSES (1977); Marcus,
Zoning Obscenity or, The Moral Politics of Porn, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1977-78);
Teachout, Chains of Tradition, Instruments of Freedom: Contours of the Emerg-
ing Right to Community in Obscenity Law, 7 CAP. U. L. REV. 683 (1978);





value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion is a legitimate state
interest means that it would find no problem in a city's expressing the
public sentiment against such social or personal behavior in the form of
a zoning control. The Fox Valley and Framingham Clinic courts found
the legislative determination that abortion clinics were against public
policy to be an intolerable use of the zoning power, as would the Young
Court have found such a public policy determination against sex
businesses. To the court in West Side Women's Services, Ina, underlying
policy motivation is not intolerable at all as long as the zoning does not
operate as a total ban on access to abortion. In other words, it is possi-
ble for the community to say, "We abhor legal abortion so we will not
permit access to legal abortion services in our area."" This is not,
however, what the Young decision permits. Young allows a determina-
tion against the secondary effects of the exercise of the constitutionally
protected right, if those secondary effects are legitimate police power
objectives. The Young Court did not allow a community to declare that
it abhorred sexually-explicit but legal material and therefore would
regulate it through zoning. The Young Court distinguished Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville," which invalidated an ordinance prohibiting adult
films from being shown at outdoor theatres, because the justification for
the Jacksonville law was the city's interest in protecting its citizens
from exposure to "offensive" speech. If the purpose of the ordinance is
to restrict the exercise of the first amendment right, be it freedom of
expression or the privacy of the abortion decision, it is not a valid zon-
ing objective.
What the Young decision accomplished was to allow communities
greater leeway in applying zoning restrictions to first amendment
related business uses if the restriction's impact on the use is minimal
and if the purpose is to further a legitimate police power objective. In
other words, if the impact is minimal, the balance tips back in favor of
" One court has stated, in dictum, that an unconstitutional legislative intent
will not invalidate an ordinance with an otherwise valid stated purpose. See
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172
(N.D. Ohio 1979). Plaintiffs claimed the abortion ordinance violated the first
amendment establishment clause because one of the "whereas" clauses to the or-
dinance, stating its purpose, read:
[I]t is the finding of Council that there is no point in time between the
union of sperm and egg, or at least the blastocyst stage and the birth of
the infant at which we can say the unborn child is not a human life, and
that the changes occuring between implantation, a six-weeks embryo, a
six-month fetus, and a one-week old child, or a mature adult are merely
stages of development and maturation . ...
Id. at 1189. The court stated that even if the council's finding amounted to a
religious belief, as long as there was also a stated secular purpose for the or-
dinance the court would not look beyond that purpose to determine if the
legislative intent was to further a religious motive. Id (dictum).
422 U.S. 205 (1977).
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the public welfare concern. Cleveland's abortion clinic ordinance meets
the minimal impact criterion more clearly than did the ordinances in the
Framingham Clinic, Fox Valley, or Planned Parenthood cases, which
served to ban such clinics either permanently or temporarily or to put
such obstacles in their paths as to effectively make low cost first
trimester abortions impossible to obtain in the area. Under Cleveland's
law, abortion clinics might still operate in semi-industrial or industrial
districts, and therefore the four east side clinics would be unaffected by
the zoning law change.86 If the question is degree of impact alone, the
Cleveland ordinance survives the test.87
The question, however, is not impact alone. Rather, it is whether the
minimal impact on the protected use is justified by the fact that the use
creates a condition which is within the zoning power to control. The
deterioration of the business and neighboring residential areas caused
by the glut of pornographic bookstores and theaters in Detroit qualified
as such a condition. None of the abortion clinic zoning ordinances were
based on a proven causal relationship between the operation of a clinic
and an undesirable community effect. The condition sought to be ad-
dressed by the Cleveland ordinance is the "community sense that
natural childbirth is preferable to abortion and that it is harmful to have
abortion services located in close proximity to residential
neighborhoods."' The West Side Women's Services, Inc, court accepted
"community sense" as a value that could be implemented by zoning. The
other courts did not.
VI. CONCLUSION
One commentator, broadly interpreting Belle Terre and Young,
perceived a growing sense of community in recent Supreme Court con-
stitutional decisions and applauded the Court for abdicating its doc-
trinaire libertarianism. The author stated that the Court had recognized
a "right to community" more comprehensive than that found in tradi-
tional police power analysis and was permitting that right to be effec-
tively preserved through zoning measures reflecting community stan-
dards."8
On the other hand, Roe and Doe are recent Supreme Court decisions
too, and they mandate that a community may not define the abortion
decision as a community problem. In addition, Maher, although allowing
a pro-birth legislative policy to determine the allocation of welfare
See note 47 supra.
67 Plaintiffs in West Side Women's Services, Inc-, did not join any potential cli-
ents who testified that their access to abortion was limited by the ordinance. See
Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 68. Perhaps such a
showing would have altered the disposition of the impact issue.
I Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5,
West Side Women's Services, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F. Supp. 796 (N.D.
Ohio 1978).




funds, would not permit an anti-abortion stance to prohibit legal abor-
tion. The essence of the abortion decision protection lies in the right to
privacy, a right which even under the broadest interpretation of "com-
munity zoning" should be beyond the reach of police power. What is
lacking is an explicit Supreme Court statement that community hostility
toward the exercise of any constitutionally protected right is an insuffi-
cient justification for the exercise of the zoning power, no matter how
minimal the degree of impact on the right. 0
,The courts in Fox Valley, Framingham Clinic, and Planned Parent-
hood of Minnesota were able to avoid deciding the propriety of zoning
regulations for abortion clinics by invalidating the ordinances solely on
their impact. However, the court in West Side Women's Services, Inc.
decided that the impact of the Cleveland ordinance was insufficient to war-
rant invalidation, faced directly with the issue, the court declared that an
anti-abortion attitude may be expressed through zoning regulation.
The furtherance of community attitudes against abortion through zon-
ing is one step removed from the community's interest in preserving
the character of its neighborhoods, which was declared in Young to be a
valid zoning abjective.91 Nonetheless, under the standards established in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland," anti-abortion zoning is an untenable
intrusion into the protected individual right.
JAN RYAN NOVAK
The inference that such a statement should be forthcoming may be drawn
from language in the recent cases. In Belle Terre, Justice Douglas noted that
there was no evidence that the ordinance prohibiting more than two unrelated in-
dividuals from living in the same residence was prompted by "animosity to un-
married couples living together," implying that such animosity would not justify
the zoning measure. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). In
Young, the Court stated that government regulation of communication may not
be "affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being expressed by
the communicator." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67
(1976). In Moore, Justice Brennan criticized the East Cleveland nuclear family or-
dinance as an attempt to impose "white suburbia's preference in patterns of family
living," implying that a community hostility toward the extended family living
patterns of minority groups was unjustified as a basis for the zoning ordinance.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 508-09 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). See also Developments, supra note 83, at 1450-57.
91 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
2 431 U.S. 494 (1977); see note 40 supra.
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